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ABSTRACT

The Internet is growing in significance in B2C electronic commerce as people become more comfortable with the
technology. Past analytical research on Internet commerce has mainly focused on its ability to lower consumers’ search
costs. Few have looked at the implications of having the Internet as an additional channel of distribution on firms. In this
paper, I adopt a game theoretic approach to analyze the impact of competition on the hybrid channel distribution problem. I
also look at a differentiated product market and highlight the role of product differentiation in Internet commerce. There are
three major findings: (1) direct marketing through the Internet can achieve channel coordination by reducing the retailer’s
markup on goods; (2) there is spillover effect such that Internet marketing implemented by a manufacturer also benefits other
manufacturers in the industry; and (3) a manufacturer implementing Internet marketing may actually want to see less product
differentiation in the industry.
Keywords

E-commerce, channels of distribution, game theory, product differentiation.
INTRODUCTION

The Internet is growing in significance as a channel of distribution as people become more comfortable with the technology.
According to a new forecast by Jupiter Research, online retail sales will grow to $65 billion this year and will continue to
increase to $117 billion by 2008 (The Washington Times, 2004). In order to keep pace with the rapid development of
Internet commerce, more and more suppliers are selling directly to the consumers through the Internet, in addition to their
traditional channels of distribution (The New York Times, 2000).
To effectively make use of this direct channel, businesses must understand the strategic implications of having a hybrid
channel of distribution. Past analytical research on Internet commerce has mainly focused on the effects of lowered
consumer search costs (Bakos, 1997; Baye and Morgan, 2001; and Iyer and Pazgal, 2003). Few have looked at the
implications of having the Internet as a retail channel. Two notable exceptions are Chiang, Chhajed and Hess (2003), and
Park and Keh (2003), but they only study the problem in a one-manufacturer (or supplier) setting.
In this paper, I extend their work by analyzing a model with two manufacturers. The aim of this paper is to answer the
following questions related to hybrid channel distribution in a competitive market: (1) Can channel coordination be achieved
as in the monopolistic manufacturer setting (Chiang, Chhajed and Hess, 2003)? (2) How is the welfare of channel members
affected by the introduction of Internet marketing? And (3) what are the implications of Internet marketing on product
differentiation? It is interesting to show that firms having a hybrid channel structure may actually want to see less product
differentiation in the industry. This is contrary to the traditional wisdom which suggests that firms’ profits always increase
with differentiation (Tirole 1988, p. 280).
In the following section, I review the existing literature on vertical channel distribution. Next, I introduce the analytical
model and present the analysis results. Finally, implications and future direction of this study are also discussed.
LITERATURE REVIEW

There exists a fair amount of literature on vertical channel distribution. Researchers in this area are typically interested in
how manufacturers could coordinate the channel by designing contracts that give retailers appropriate incentives to make
decisions that are optimal for the manufacturers (Gerstner and Hess, 1991; Jeuland and Shugan, 1983; Lal, 1990; McGuire
and Staelin, 1983). Mechanisms for channel coordination include franchise fees, resale-price maintenance, quantity fixing,
and other vertical restraints (Tirole, 1988). Recently, Chiang, Chhajed and Hess (2003) point out that the mere existence of a
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direct Internet channel from the manufacturer, without even delivering any sales, can achieve a certain level of channel
coordination in a one-manufacturer one-retailer channel structure. As shall be shown shortly, my analysis in a twomanufacturer setting is consistent with their finding.
Since vertical restraints or pricing schemes are not the focus of this paper, previous work in these areas are not reviewed here.
Table 1 lists some of the previous analytical research related to channel structure. Note that only the last two studies look at
hybrid channel distribution. Figure 1 shows the channel structures pictorially.

Paper

Channel Structure*

Summary

Jeuland and
Shugan, 1983

1M, 1R (Fig. 1a)

This paper demonstrates the need for channel coordination and compares
the advantages of a number of mechanisms, e.g., joint ownership, simple
contracts, implicit understanding, profit sharing, and quantity discounts.

McGuire and
Staelin, 1983

2M, 2R (Fig. 1b)

This paper studies the effect of product substitutability. Dixit’s demand
function (1979) is used for their game-theoretic analysis. It is found that
with low degrees of substitutabilities (i.e., more differentiation), each
manufacturer will distribute its product through a company store; for
highly competitive goods, manufacturers are more likely to use a
decentralized distributed system.

Choi, 1991

2M, 1R (Fig. 1c)

The constant elasticity demand and linear demand are analyzed. Three
types of games between the vertical channel members are examined: 1)
Vertical Nash, 2) Manufacturer Stackelberg, and 3) Retailer Stackelberg.
The manufacturer’s preference for an exclusive dealer is different
depending on the form of the demand function and the level of product
differentiation.

Choi, 1996

2M, 2R (Fig. 1d)

This paper only looks at the linear demand function. Again, three games
are studied: 1) Vertical Nash, 2) Manufacturing Stackelberg, and 3)
Retailer Stackelberg. However, the model includes one extra retailer and
studies the effect of retail brand differentiation. Raju, Sethuraman and
Dhar’s demand function (1984) is used. It is found that while product
differentiation helps manufacturers, it hurts retailers. Conversely, while
store differentiation helps retailers, it hurts manufacturers.

Lee and Staelin,
1997

1M, 1R (Fig.1a)

This paper generalizes vertical strategic interaction by analyzing all the
traditional channel structures shown in Figure 1.

2M, 2R (Fig. 1b and 1c)
2M, 2R (Fig. 1d)

Chiang, Chhajed
and Hess, 2003

1M, 1R (Fig. 1e)

Park and Keh, 2003

1M, 1R (Fig. 1e)

1M, multiple-R (Fig. 1f)

This paper shows that Internet marketing can profit the manufacturer
even when no Internet sales are made. On the other hand, the Internet
channel may not always be detrimental to the retailer because it will be
accompanied by a wholesale price reduction.
Three types of games between the vertical members are analyzed: 1)
Vertical Nash, 2) Manufacturer Stackelberg, and 3) Retailer Stackelberg.
The effect of Internet marketing on the welfare of each channel member
is discussed for each game.
* M = Manufacturer, R = Retailer

Table 1. Review of Existing Analytical Research on Vertical Channel Structure
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Manufacturer /
Supplier

Manufacturer /
Supplier

Manufacturer /
Supplier

Retailer

Retailer

Retailer

Consumers

Consumers

(a)

(b)

Manufacturer /
Supplier

Manufacturer /
Supplier

Retailer

Manufacturer /
Supplier

Manufacturer /
Supplier

Retailer

Retailer

Consumers

Consumers

(c)

(d)

Manufacturer /
Supplier

Manufacturer /
Supplier

Internet

Internet
Retailer

Retailer

Retailer

Consumers

Consumers

(e)

(f)

Figure 1. Channel Structures Analyzed in Studies Listed in Table 1

THE MODEL

The channel structure in this study has two manufacturers and a common retailer, as shown in Figure 2. Each manufacturer
has the option to introduce an Internet channel to reach consumers directly. If both manufacturers do not engage in Internet
marketing, this structure would be the same as that in Figure 1c, which represents an industry in which retailers implement
product line pricing but serve completely separate markets (Choi, 1991; Lee and Staelin, 1997; Sudhir, 2001). It is the
simplest model structure that can address the research questions of this study.
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Manufacturer

Manufacturer
Intern

Intern
Retailer
Consumers
Figure 2. Channel Structure of this Study

Consumer demand

Although it is realized that different forms of demand would yield different and sometimes conflicting results (Choi, 1991;
Jeuland and Shugan, 1988), it is common to assume that demand has a linear form. In an oligopolistic market, demand for
each firm’s product is contigent on the prices of other firms' products. The “cross-price sensitivity” is often used to capture
this feature (Choi, 1996; Park and Keh, 2003). Raju, Sethuraman and Dhar (1994) introduced this notion of “cross-price
sensitivity” based on the n-firm oligopolistic model developed by Shubik and Levitan (1980), in which the demand for Firm
i’s product set at price pi is given by
di =

1
(α − β [ pi + γ ( pi − p )])
n

(1)

where α denotes the base demand or the market size, β the industry demand slope, γ the substitutability of the products in the
oligopolistic market, and p the average price. Importantly, this demand function is consistent with the utility maximizing
behavior.
Case I: No Internet Marketing

Adhering to the common approach used in Raju, Sethuraman and Dhar (1994), Choi (1996), and Park and Keh (2003), I
model the demand for Product A distributed by the Retailer (QRA) and the demand for Product B distributed by the Retailer
(QRB) as
1
(1 − PRA + δ [PRB − PRA ])
2
1
= (1 − PRB + δ [PRA − PRB ])
2

QRA =
QRB

(2)

where PRA and PRB are, respectively, the retail prices of Product A and Product B. Adding QRA and QRB together gives the
total industry demand 1 − PRA + PRB . In other words, the base industry demand is normalized to one and the total industry
2

demand decreases with the average price of the horizontally differentiated products. δ ∈[0,1] is the cross-price sensitivity
between Product A and Product B. It can also be used to measure the degree of product substitutability or differentiation.
The higher the value of δ, the higher the product substitutability and the lower the differentiation.
Case II: One Internet Channel

Suppose Manufacturer A now introduces Internet marketing. As in Chiang, Chhajed and Hess (2003), I assume that
valuation of a product sold through the Internet is lower than that sold through a traditional retail channel. The assumption is
reasonable because unlike physical stores, the Internet deprives consumers of evaluation of products by touch, taste, and
smell. Further, Internet purchases often require consumers to wait several days for delivery. To guarantee a positive demand
for the Internet channel, PIA, the price at which Product A is sold through the Internet, has to be cheaper than PRA, the price at
which Product A is sold in the Retailer. Hence, PIA < PRA. To capture this feature, I model the various demands for the case
where only Manufacturer A implements hybrid channel distribution as
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1
(1 − PRA + δ [PRB − PRA ] + θ [PIA − PRA ])
2
1
QIA = (θ [PRA − PIA ] + δθ [PRB − PIA ])
2
1
QRB = (1 − PRB + δ [PRA − PRB ] + δθ [PIA − PRB ])
2
QRA =

(3)

In this case, the total industry demand remains 1 − PRA + PRB . Consumers who used to buy Product A from the Retailer would
2
consider switching to buy Product A directly from the Internet if PIA is lower than PRA and the Internet channel is found
capable of substituting the retail channel. The degree of substitutability of the Retailer by the Internet channel is measured by
θ ∈[0,1], which can also be viewed as the consumer acceptance of the Internet channel in the industry. If the difference
PRB – PIA is low enough, Product A sold through the Internet can also attract consumers who originally purchase Product B
from the Retailer. However, given that Product B is differentiated from Product A, Product A distributed by the Internet is
less able to substitute Product B distributed by the Retailer. Hence, the cross-price sensitivity of Product B sold through
Retailer and Product A sold through the Internet should be smaller than min[θ,δ]. To keep the model simple without
introducing another parameter, this cross-price sensitivity is modeled as δθ. The assumption here is that the channel effect
and the differentiation effect are independent and multiplicative.
Case III: Two Internet Channels

Finally, when both Manufacturers make use of the Internet to reach consumers directly, the various demands are modeled as
1
(1 − PRA + δ [PRB − PRA ] + θ [PIA − PRA ] + δθ [PIB − PRA ])
2
1
QIA = (θ [PRA − PIA ] + δθ [PRB − PIA ])
2
1
QRB = (1 − PRB + δ [PRA − PRB ] + θ [PIB − PRB ] + δθ [PIA − PRB ])
2
1
QIB = (θ [PRB − PIB ] + δθ [PRA − PIB ])
2

QRA =

(4)

The three cases discussed here will be studied separately in the Analysis and Discussion section.
Vertical Strategic Interaction

Choi (1991) distinguishes three types of vertical strategic interaction depending on the power structure along the vertical
channel: the Vertical Nash game, the Manufacturer Stackelberg game, and the Retailer Stackelberg game. In the Vertical
Nash game, each manufacturer chooses its wholesale price conditional on both the Retailer’s margins and the observed retail
price of the competing firm. The Retailer determines the retail margins for both products conditional on the wholesale prices.
The manufacturers and the Retailer make their moves simultaneously. In the Manufacturer Stackelberg game, the
manufacturers are the price leaders in the vertical channel. Each manufacturer chooses the wholesale price using the
response function of the Retailer, conditional on the observed wholesale price of the competitor’s product. The Retailer,
being the follower, determines the margins on each product given the respective wholesale prices. Finally, in the Retailer
Stackelberg game, each manufacturer chooses its wholesale price conditional on both the Retailer's margin on its own
product and the observed retail price of the competing product. The Retailer determines the margins on each product using
the response functions of both manufacturers. Note that in all of the three games, the horizontal strategic interaction between
the manufacturers is assumed to be a Nash game.
As in Chiang, Chhajed and Hess (2003), I will only analyze the Manufacturer Stackelberg game, even though the Vertical
Nash and Retailer Stackelberg games can also be solved easily. The objective here is to keep this paper within a reasonable
length.
Problem Solving

Suppose the manufacturers and the Retailer all engage in simple pricing schemes. The per unit wholesale prices for Product
A and Product B are, respectively, wA and wB, and the per unit retail margins for Product A and Product B are, respectively,
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mA and mB. For simplicity, assume further that all delivery costs are zero. The retail prices for Product A and Product B are
given by
PRA = wA + mA

(5)

PRB = wB + mB

The Retailer's profit (ΠR) is given by
Π R = QRAmA + QRB mB

(6)

The profit for Manufacturer A and Manufacturer B are dependent on whether Internet marketing exists and they are presented
in Table 2.

Different cases

Manufacturer A's profit

Manufacturer B's profit

No Internet Marketing

Π A = QRA wA

Π B = QRB wB

One Internet Channel (by Manufacturer A)

Π A = QRA wA + QIA PIA

Π B = QRB wB

Two Internet Channels

Π A = QRA wA + QIA PIA

Π B = QRB wB + QIB PIB

Table 2. Manufacturers' Profit by Different Cases

In a Manufacturer Stackelberg game, the Retailer takes the wholesale prices as given. The Retailer's profit maximization
problem is, therefore, only dependent on the margins mA and mB, i.e.,

max Π R (mA , mB )

(7)

m A , mB

The optimal margins mA* and mB* calculated from the Retailer’s maximization problem should be in terms of PRA, PIA (if
applicable), PRB, and PIB (if applicable). They can then be substituted into the profit maximization problems of Manufacturer
A and Manufacturer B as follows.

(
)
(m (w , P ), m (w , P ), w , P )

max Π A m*A (wA , PIA ), m*B (wA , PIA ), wA , PIA

w A , PIA

max Π B

w B , PIB

*
A

B

IB

*
B

B

IB

B

(8)

IB

Note that if an Internet channel is not present, the maximization problems simply would not involve the Internet prices PIA or
PIB. The optimal solutions for wA*, PIA∗ (if applicable), wB*, and PIB∗ (if applicable) in terms of δ and θ can then be used to
compute back mA* and mB* in terms of δ and θ. The equilibrium prices, demands, and profits for various channel players can
also be calculated easily. These quantities should be again in terms of δ and θ.
I present here analysis of the simplest case as an example. When Manufacturer A and Manufacturer B sell only through the
traditional retail channel, the demands for their products is given by Eq. (2). Substituting these quantities and the retail prices
(Eq. 5) in the Retailer's profit function (Eq. 6), the Retailer's profit maximization problem becomes

max

m A , mB

ΠR =

mA
[1 − wA − mA + δ (wB + mB − wA − mA )]
2
m
+ B [1 − wB − mB + δ (wA + mA − wB − mB )]
2

(9)

Taking the wholesale prices as given, the Retailer maximizes profit by setting its optimal margins mA∗ and mB∗ to be
1 − wA
2
1
wB
−
mB* =
2
m*A =
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With the knowledge of the Retailer's response function, Manufacturer A and Manufacturer B then maximize their profits
conditional on the observed retail price of the competing product. They substitute Eq. (10) into their corresponding
manufacturer profit functions in Table 2 and their respective profit maximization problems become
max
wA

max
wB

mA
(1 − wA + δ (wB − wA ))
4
m
Π A = B (1 − wB + δ (wA − wB ))
4
ΠA =

(11)

Solving these problems simultaneously give the optimal wholesale prices
w*A = wB* =

1
δ +2

(12)

Substituting wA* and wB* back into Eq. (10), the optimal retail margins in terms of δ are
m*A = mB* =

δ +1
2(δ + 2)

(13)

The equilibrium prices PRA and PRB, the quantity demanded QRA and QRB, and the channel players' profits ΠR, ΠA and ΠB can
be then be calculated easily by Eq. (5), Eq. (2), Eq. (6) and the corresponding manufacturer profit functions in Table 2.
This procedure is repeated to solve for the other two cases with Internet marketing. The mathematics involved in solving
these problems are simple enough to be handled by mathematical software packages such as Maple and Mathematica and
they are not presented here.
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

Closed form solutions could be obtained, but they are too complicated for interpretation. Instead, my analysis is based on
comparative statics. Due to the constraint on length, I present only the ones relevant to my research questions.
Case I: No Internet Marketing

Obviously, the equilibrium is only dependent on product substitutability (δ); channel substitutability (θ) is irrelevant in this
case. Table 3 shows the comparative statics and Figure 3 shows how the manufacturers and the Retailer’s profit change in δ.
Note that the vertical channel in this case is symmetrical such that the equilibrium quantities for Manufacturer A and
Manufacturer B are equal.
The comparative statics in Table 3 show that as δ increases (less product differentiation), the wholesale prices wA* and wB*
decrease, while the retail margins mA* and mB* increase. The overall effect is decreased manufacturer profits and increased
retailer profits as shown in Figure 3. Consistent with the existing literature, our results show that the manufacturers’ profits
always increase with product differentiation.

∂w*A ∂wB*
=
∂δ
∂δ

-ve

∂m*A ∂m*B
=
∂δ
∂δ

+ve

∂Π*R
∂δ

+ve

∂Π *A ∂Π *B
=
∂δ
∂δ

-ve

Table 3. Comparative Statics for Case I
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Profit
0.12

0.1

Retailer's profit

0.08

0.06
Manufacturer A's profit =
Manufacturer B's profit

0.04

0.02

0
0

0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9

1

δ
Decreasing product substitutability /
Increasing product differentiation

Increasing product substitutability /
Decreasing product differentiation

Figure 3. Equilibrium Profits for Case I

Case II: One Internet Channel

Both product substitutability (δ) and channel substitutability (θ) affect the equilibrium in this case. The comparative statics
are shown in Table 4. Figure 4 shows the changes of the manufacturer and retailer profits with respect to δ while keeping θ
constant.

(

∂Π*R
∂δ

+ve

∂m*A
∂θ

-ve

∂Π *A
∂δ

?

∂mB*
∂θ

-ve

∂Π *B
∂δ

?

∂Π*R
∂θ

-ve

-ve

∂Π *A
∂θ

+ve

∂Π *B
∂θ

+ve

(

*
*
*
∂ QRA
+ QIA
/ QRA
∂δ

))

Table 4. Comparative Statics for Case II
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θ = 0.1

Profit

θ = 0.5

Profit

0.12

0.14
Manufacturer A's profit

Retailer's profit

0.1
optimal at
around δ = 0.4

0.08

0.12

0.1

Manufacturer A's profit

0.08

optimal at
around δ = 0.1

0.06
Manufacturer B's profit

Retailer's profit

0.06
Manufacturer B's profit

0.04
0.04

0.02

0.02

0
0

0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9

0

1

0

0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9

δ
Decreasing product substitutability /
Increasing product differentiation

1

δ
Increasing product substitutability /
Decreasing product differentiation

Decreasing product substitutability /
Increasing product differentiation

Increasing product substitutability /
Decreasing product differentiation

(a)
Profit

δ = 0.5

0.18
Manufacturer A's profit

0.16
0.14
0.12
0.1
0.08

Manufacturer B's profit

0.06
Retailer's profit

0.04
0.02
0
0

0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9

1

θ
Decreasing channel substitutability

Increasing channel substitutability

(b)
Figure 4. Equilibrium Profits for Case II
With respect to δ

When Manufacturer A introduces Internet marketing, the role of product substitutability is changed slightly. The Retailer
still wants to see higher product substitutability, or less differentiation. However, Manufacturer A is ambivalent to product
differentiation. On the one hand, more differentiation gives Manufacturer A more power over the Retailer and the
consumers. On the other hand, with less differentiation, Manufacturer A's Internet channel is better able to attract
Manufacturer B's customers (since they see little difference between the two products) and exert competitive pressure on the
Retailer. My numerical analysis shows that when channel substitutability θ is small, there exists an optimal level of
differentiation for Manufacturer A beyond which its profit would drop. In Figure 4a, we can see that when θ = 0.1 the
optimal level of differentiation for Manufacturer A is approximately δ = 0.4. Beyond a certain level of channel
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substitutability, Manufacturer A actually unambiguously prefers less differentiation, as shown in the case for θ = 0.5 in
Figure 4a.
*
*
*
It is interesting to note that ∂ (QRA / (QRA + QIA )) is negative, indicating that Manufacturer A’s reliance on the traditional retail
∂δ
channel decreases when there is less product differentiation. This is because when product differentiation is low, some
consumers who normally prefer Product B may find that the degree of differentiation is not significant enough to make
purchase of Product B at a higher price through the Retailer worthwhile. As a result, sales of Product A through the Internet
increase, reducing Manufacturer A’s reliance on the traditional retail channel.

Further, I find that Manufacturer B’s attitude towards differentiation is also ambiguous when only Manufacturer A adopts
hybrid channel distribution. This is rather counter-intuitive. The explanation for this finding is that competitive pressure
created by sales of close to homogeneous products through the Internet channel forces to the Retailer to cut its retail margins
drastically, resulting in lower retail prices and higher retail sales volume for Product B. Therefore, it may happen that
Manufacturer B's benefits from lower retail margins more than compensate the loss of customers to Manufacturer A. My
numerical analysis shows that when channel substitutability is high enough, there exists an optimal level of differentiation for
Manufacturer B beyond which its profit would drop. For example, as shown in Figure 4a, when θ = 0.5, the optimal level of
product differentiation for Manufacturer B is around δ = 0.1.
Thus, we observe here some spillover effect of Internet
marketing.
With respect to θ

Comparative statics with respect to channel substitutability (θ) give intuitive and unambiguous results. The Internet channel
gives Manufacturer A the power to charge at a higher wholesale price wA. The reliance on the traditional retail channel
decreases as consumers find it more substitutable by the Internet channel. The Retailer has to lower its margins in order to
stay competitive and this move further undermines its profit. On the other hand, increased sales through the Internet increase
Manufacturer A's profit.
Manufacturer B is also better off when channel substitutability is high. Although its wholesale prices wB are lowered under
the competitive pressure of the Internet channel, the retail margins on Product B mB are also lowered by the Retailer under the
same competitive pressure. Therefore, overall, Product B is cheaper and consumers purchase more, allowing Manufacturer B
to earn a higher profit than it would if there is no Internet channel in the market. Again, we observe here the spillover effect
of channel coordination.
Case III: Two Internet Channels

When Manufacturer B also makes use of the Internet to market its products, the vertical channel becomes symmetrical as in
Case I. The equilibrium quantities for Manufacturer A and Manufacturer B are again equal. The comparative statics for this
case are shown in Table 5. Figure 5 shows the changes of the manufacturer and retailer profits with respect to δ while
keeping θ constant.

∂Π*R
∂δ

+ve

∂Π *A ∂Π *B
=
∂δ
∂δ

?

∂m*A ∂mB*
=
∂θ
∂θ

-ve

∂Π *R
∂θ

-ve

∂Π *A ∂Π *B
=
∂θ
∂θ

+ve

Table 5. Comparative Statics for Case III
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θ = 0.5

Profit

optimal at
around δ = 0.1

0.09

Manufacturer A's profit =
Manufacturer B's profit

0.08
0.07
0.06

Retailer's profit

0.05
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.01
0
0

0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9

1

δ
Decreasing product substitutability /
Increasing product differentiation

Increasing product substitutability /
Decreasing product differentiation

(a)
δ = 0.5

Profit

0.1
Manufacturer A's profit =
Manufacturer B's profit

0.09
0.08
0.07
0.06
0.05
0.04

Retailer's profit

0.03
0.02
0.01
0
0

0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9

1

θ
Decreasing channel substitutability

Increasing channel substitutability

(b)
Figure 5. Equilibrium Profits for Case III

As it turns out, comparative statics with respect to δ for this case do not add much to our understanding of Internet marketing.
As in the previous cases, the Retailer’s profit increases with lower product differentiation. The manufacturers’ attitude
towards product differentiation is still ambiguous. However, in this case, Manufacturer A’s favorability towards product
homogeneity is much lessened with the knowledge that Manufacturer B’s Internet channel is also able to make consumers
switch. Both manufacturers now generally prefer high product differentiation. However, as differentiation increases, Internet
marketing becomes less attractive a distribution channel to the consumers compared to the Retailer. Beyond a certain level of
differentiation, Internet marketing no longer generates significant profits for the manufacturers. As a result, profits begin to
drop. This trend is similar to that observed in Case II for Manufacturer A’s profit.
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Comparative statics with respect to θ for this case are again similar to those for Case II. With higher channel substitutability,
the retailer profit decreases as a result of lowered retail margins; whereas the manufacturer profits increase with increased
sales as a result of lower retail prices and increased Internet sales.
Discussion

In this analysis, there are three interesting findings:
1.

Internet marketing can achieve channel coordination by reducing the retailer’s markup on goods. This is consistent with
findings in a monopolistic manufacturer setting.

2.

There is spillover effect such that Internet marketing by a manufacturer also benefits other manufacturers in the industry.

3.

Manufacturers adopting hybrid channel distribution may actually want to see less product differentiation in the industry.

Channel coordination achieved by Internet marketing is equivalent to saying that the Retailer is worse off as it faces
additional competition. In fact, my numerical analysis shows that unless the Retailer is able to differentiate itself from the
Internet such that channel substitutability equal to zero (θ = 0), its profit will be decreased with the introduction of Internet
marketing. A managerial implication of this finding is that traditional retailers should provide consumers value-added
services that could not be delivered through the Internet. This way, the consumers will find that their services are
irreplaceable by the Internet.
The second finding on the spillover effect is also related to channel coordination. The introduction of Internet marketing by
some manufacturers (or suppliers) in an industry can achieve channel coordination that benefits all manufacturers (or
suppliers) in the industry. Those who implement Internet marketing obviously are able to push retail margins of their
products lower. A rather unexpected outcome, however, is that retailers have to also lower the margins on products supplied
by those not implementing Internet marketing. This is because the retailers are afraid that customers who normally buy
products supplied by those without an Internet channel would switch to buy other brands through the Internet if the selling
prices of these products are too high. As a result, the retail margins on all products in the industry are lowered, resulting in
overall cheaper selling prices, higher sales volume and higher consumer surplus.
The third finding offers new insights to the role of product differentiation in Internet commerce. Traditionally, the more
differentiated products are in an industry, the closer to the monopolistic price the manufacturers could charge. Hence, more
differentiation is always preferred by the manufacturers. This study has shown that traditional wisdom on product
differentiation may be too simplistic for understanding Internet commerce. With less differentiation, consumers see less
value-added making purchases from physical retail stores, and thus they are more willing to shop online. As a result,
manufacturers who implement Internet marketing may actually get more business online when differentiation is low.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH

In this study, I make use of a simple analytical model to investigate the effect of Internet marketing on vertical channel
distribution in a two-manufacturer setting. It is found that channel coordination can be achieved as in the monopolistic
manufacturer case. It provides another explanation of increased consumer surplus provided by Internet commerce other than
reduced search costs and increased product variety (Brynjolfsson, Hu and Smith, 2003). It is also shown that role of product
differentiation is more complicated in Internet commerce than in traditional retail businesses.
Although there are some interesting results, there are many opportunities for future research. First, to make this study
complete, the Retailer Stackelberg and Vertical Nash game for the vertical strategic interaction should also be analyzed and
compared. Second, hybrid channel distribution should be investigated in a 2-manufacturer and 2- retailer setting to see
whether it would produce results different from Park and Keh (2003), Chiang, Chhajed, and Hess (2003), and this study.
Finally, empirical support should be sought to verify the findings.
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